Consistency and the theory of truth

Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):424-466 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper attempts to address the question what logical strength theories of truth have by considering such questions as: If you take a theory T and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to T? Once the question has been properly formulated, the answer turns out to be about as elegant as one could want: Adding a theory of truth to a finitely axiomatized theory T is more or less equivalent to a kind of abstract consistency statement. A large part of the interest of the paper lies in the way syntactic theories are 'disentangled' from object theories.

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Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University

Citations of this work

Axiomatic theories of truth.Volker Halbach - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles.Richard Heck - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (1):1-33.
Equivalences for Truth Predicates.Carlo Nicolai - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):322-356.

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References found in this work

The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Axiomatic Theories of Truth.Volker Halbach - 2010 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Fixing Frege.John P. Burgess - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Atwell Turquette - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (1):113.
On the scheme of induction for bounded arithmetic formulas.A. J. Wilkie & J. B. Paris - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 35 (C):261-302.

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