Abstract

This dissertation attempts to defend a broadly Kantian conception of practical rationality against the type of moral skepticism associated with "rational egoism" models of action. The latter are skeptical insofar as they propose an account of justification that excludes what we normally consider to be specifically moral reasons for action. Underlying this account of justification is what is generally referred to as an instrumental conception of rationality. The adequacy of this variety of moral skepticism can therefore be evaluated by examining this model of action, in particular, the sophisticated formulation provided by contemporary rational choice theory. ;In the first chapter, I examine and defend the most powerful sociological objection to the instrumental view, the so-called "problem of order." I offer a general game-theoretic reformulation of this argument, in order to show that certain significant features of social organization are inexplicable from within the rational choice framework. In the second chapter, I show how Emile Durkheim tries to solve this problem by developing what amounts to a detranscendentalized version of Kant's moral action theory. He argues that in order to explain the relationship between culture and social organization, one must credit agents with the capacity to follow rules without incentive. ;The remainder of the dissertation shows how various attempts to overcome problems with the Kantian view have been introduced by way of refinements in this "sociological" model of action. In the third chapter, I show how Talcott Parsons develops the concept of a social institution in order to solve the higher-order choice problem generated by Kant's typological action theory. The solution hinges upon the insight that socially shared rules, unlike categorical imperatives, determine both the obligations of ego and the legitimate expectations of alter. In the final chapter, I show how Jurgen Habermas's extension of the model to include speech acts opens up the possibility of both a rationality-based conception of norm-governed action, and a non-foundationalist, yet clearly cognitivist account of moral argumentation.