An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens

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Abstract

Think of confirmation in the context of the Ravens Paradox this way. The likelihood ratio measure of incremental confirmation gives us, for an observed Black Raven and for an observed non-Black non-Raven, respectively, the following “full” likelihood ratios

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Author Profiles

Branden Fitelson
Northeastern University
James Hawthorne
University of Oklahoma

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