Abstract

While it is by no means novel to express interest in the relation between the philosophy of Spinoza and the psychoanalysis of Freud, there has been no comprehensive attempt to articulate the substance of this relation. My purpose here is as much critical as it is exegetical, for I intend to show how certain principles articulated in Spinoza's philosophy can be usefully invoked as a means to comprehend what, I shall argue, are the major inadequacies of Freud's metapsychology. Central to my dissertation is an investigation of the difference between dialectic and dualism which, I believe, meaningfully discloses the content of the differences between Spinoza and Freud. For what decisively separates Spinoza from Freud is the adequacy of their interpretations of certain central oppositions which preoccupy both thinkers. In comprehending these oppositions as capable of mediation, Spinoza invokes a dialectic with which he contends that the "opposites" involved in these different conflicts nevertheless presuppose a common ground of truth. In contrast, Freud, who interprets these oppositions as dualistic, invokes a critique with which he suggests that there can be no resolution of these conflicts. Since dualism cuts across his entire metapsychology, Freud consistently faces the self-referential problem of explaining how his own psychoanalytic therapy is possible, i.e., how the mediation of psychical opposition is possible amidst the dualisms which he considers to be beyond resolution. The startling fact is that Freud's metapsychology squarely contradicts his therapy, for it is the common insight of both Spinoza and Freud to show that any psychical conflict between "opposites" nevertheless presupposes a commonality between these opposites which dualism otherwise denies or represses. Since this metapsychology contradicts the mediating efforts of his therapy, we require an interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy which stresses consistently that these "opposites" presuppose a commonality of relationship between them