Abstract

Thomas Aquinas's ethical writings have, in recent years, become increasingly influential in Anglo-American philosophy. However, the plausibility of Aquinas's moral philosophy depends on the plausibility of the action theory which it presupposes. My goal, therefore, is to set out Aquinas's action theory and the theory of responsibility, praise, and blame that it contributes to. In the course of my discussion, I show that Aquinas's views, while controversial, are still interesting, generally plausible, and as capable of answering difficult questions as contemporary competitors. ;Aquinas asserts that actions deserve praise or blame only insofar as they are voluntary; and they are voluntary only insofar as they find their source in the will. Accordingly, I first examine Aquinas's discussion of the will and its acts. Against commentators who read Aquinas as a moderate voluntarist, I argue that Aquinas is an intellectualist: The will always desires what the intellect judges good, and it always chooses that alternative which the intellect has judged most worthy of pursuit. ;Such a view seems to obviate the need for virtue in the will . Therefore, Aquinas should--but does not--explain how this view is compatible with his further claim that human beings need virtue of the will in order to attain their ultimate end. I offer an explanation on Aquinas's behalf. ;Aquinas argues that human beings are responsible agents because they are principal or planning agents. Through deliberation, they can set goals, revise them through reflection, specify them, and determine how best to achieve them. Therefore, they earn praise or blame for events they plan and bring about. However, Aquinas argues further that human beings deserve praise or blame for some events they do not plan and bring about, including omissions and some unforeseen consequences of their actions or omissions. Although unplanned, these events are suitably related to the agent as a planner, and for this reason are voluntary.