The Metaphysics of Consistency

Review of Metaphysics 2 (7):3 - 29 (1949)
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Abstract

However, metaphysics itself has presuppositions. In the order of explanation the governing presupposition of intelligible metaphysics is that the world itself is intelligible. By 'intelligible' I mean 'free from contradiction'. By 'the world' I mean the range of things that possess being of any kind, or, in other words, the realm of being. If the presupposition referred to is accepted metaphysics is possible; if not, it is not. The word 'presupposition' must be taken literally. The presupposition in question is, in fact, a presupposition and cannot be proved. It is not possible to prove that the world--the aggregate of things--is intelligible. Any attempted proof is circular. It would, in essence, be obliged to say: the world is noncontradictory for, were it contradictory, this circumstance itself would involve a contradiction. But this is equivalent to the assumption that the contradictory is impossible; which in turn is nothing but the conclusion given as a premise. To say that the contradictory is impossible is simply to say, in other words, that nothing is or can be contradictory, which was the point to be proved. Hence, though the presupposition that the world is intelligible is necessary, it is, nevertheless, a presupposition and cannot be demonstrated.

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Infinte Regress Arguments.Claude Gratton - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.

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