Metempsychosis in Shaykh al-Ishraq

Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 45 (unknown)
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Abstract

Death and immortality have always been among the most fundamental topics occupying man's mind. In fact, the issues related to the quality of immortality after death have always enjoyed newness, and various theories and ideas have been presented in this regard. The theory of metempsychosis introduces one of the oldest human beliefs. Like other early philosophers, Suhrawardi also dealt with this issue in detail in his various works except for Hikmat al-ishraq. He mainly talked about the impossibility of metempsychosis and its absurdity and followed the theories of Peripatetic philosophy in this regard. However, his denial of this issue, specifically in the above-mentioned book, lost color, and it seems that he did not intend to give up this theory. The purpose of this paper is to study and discover his final view in this regard.The paper concludes that, considering his own principles, Suhrawardi must have been against metempsychosis; however, his final words in Hikmat al-ishraq, which, in a way, represent his ultimate view of this theory, show his doubts in this regard. Thus we can neither accept that he finally refuted metempsychosis nor agree that he believed in it. Perhaps his doubts and hesitations in this respect were inspired by lack of a distinction between resurrection and metempsychosis in the words of the people of intuition, his own intuitions, as well as the secretive nature of the words of ancient Iranian and Greek philosophers.

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