Wide Functionalism

In Reasoning, meaning, and mind. New York: Oxford University Press (1999)
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Abstract

Psychological explanation is a kind of functional explanation, like some biological explanation, where the relevant functions tend to have to do with perceiving and acting in relation to the environment. Pain serves as a kind of alarm system; perception allows an organism to get information about the environment etc. Although there are defenders of a narrow, more solipsistic psychological functionalism, the dominant trend has involved the wider version. In any event, the wider functionalism is clearly more plausible and methodological solipsism in psychology is incoherent.

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original Harman, Gilbert (1988) "Wide functionalism". In Schiffer, Stephen R., Steele, Susan, Cognition and Representation, pp. 11--20: Westview Press (1988)

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Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

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The analytic/synthetic distinction.Gillian Russell - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):712–729.

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