Abstract

The dissertation argues that Nietzsche's critical evaluation of pity and what he calls the morality of pity is a central part of his revalution of all moral values, as well as many other of his philosophical projects, e.g., his reaction to the death of God and the rise of nihilism. Many of Nietzsche's major works--Daybreak, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and On the Genealogy--can be read as a prolonged struggle with the problem of Mitleid and the morality of Mitleid. I argue that Nietzsche makes a crucial distinction between good and bad Mitleid. I show how this distinction helps us to appreciate Nietzsche's criticisms of benevolent fellow feelings, Christian morality, intellectualism and of both egoism and altruism. It also throws light on Nietzsche's notion of a higher morality. ;Finally I argue that there are structural parallels between Nietzsche's conception of good and bad Mitleid and his conception of good and bad readers. Similar parallels exist between his conception of persons of good Milted and those who are driven by bad Mitleid on the one hand and cheerful and false authors on the other hand. Because of these parallels, Nietzsche's distinction between good and bad Mitleid throws light on how he conceives of his role as a philosopher and an author