Abstract

It may seem that there are a number of different _oughts_. There is a moral _ought_, there is a prudential _ought_, etc. Furthermore, it may seem that each _ought_ is such that one ought to do the best thing one could do, where the sense of best at issue varies with the kind of _ought_ it is. Thus, it seems that morally, a person ought to do the morally best thing she could do; and prudentially, a person ought to do the prudentially best thing she could do. This suggests that the moral _ought_ and the prudential _ought_ often conflict, and thus that often, morally, one ought to do something although, prudentially, one ought to refrain from doing it. I will dispute these natural thoughts, and offer an alternative view in their place. There is no distinctively moral _ought_, though there are some _ought_ facts that are distinctively moral. Similarly, there is no distinctively prudential _ought_, though there are some _ought_ facts that are distinctively prudential. Finally, true distinctively moral _ought_ claims never conflict with true distinctively prudential _ought_ claims: it is never the case that, morally, one ought to do something, while prudentially, one ought to refrain.