Some Reflections on the Ethics of Knowledge and Belief

Religious Studies 23 (3):325 - 336 (1987)
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Abstract

Knowledge is desirable both for its own sake and because without it we will not be able to take the right means to whatever ends we happen to have. Much knowledge is interesting to oneself and others as well as useful, and a man without it will be an impoverished bore, as well as being unsuccessful in his enterprises

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