Abstract

Is the ontological proof "superfluous if sound"? Perhaps yes, in one sense. One premiss of the proof—a premiss challenged by positivists or "a priori atheists" —is the conceivability of divine existence. Whether or not this can be proved, it can be argued for by challenging the opponent to exhibit inconsistency or failure of meaning in the definition of divinity. To this extent the proof may have force independently of other theistic proofs. However, I incline to agree with Purtill that any such proof which establishes the conceivability of God can as well or better be so formulated that it directly establishes his existence. For instance, if an ordered world is at least conceivable, then so is a divine orderer of the world, since a world cannot order itself or be ordered by anything less than God. But one can as well argue: there must be cosmic order, since a mere chaos or vacuous world is a pseudoconcept, and only God could institute or maintain cosmic order, hence God's existence is a necessity. There are other arguments which are probably no less than persuasive if addressed directly to God's necessary existence as if used only to establish his conceivability. In this sense the ontological proof might be termed superfluous.