Abstract

I argue that the principles of traditional Liberal Democratic Theory necessarily entail the following political and epistemological consequences: that citizens have a right to freedom of belief; that government has an interest in the beliefs of citizens only insofar as that interest contributes to the protection of freedom of belief; that Liberal Democratic Theory is implicitly committed to certain values which are constitutive of epistemic responsibility. Finally, I will investigate the logical, conceptual, political, moral, and practical relations which obtain between freedom of belief and epistemic responsibility. ;I maintain that belief and expression are integrally related. Since Liberal Democratic Theory is fundamentally committed to freedom of expression, it is by extension committed to freedom of belief. Moreover, Liberal Democratic Theory is implicitly committed to some of the values which are constitutive of epistemic responsibility; as a result, these values should guide democratic governments in the administration of freedom of belief. To support the political claims of this project I appeal to John Locke's political philosophy, the U.S. Constitution, John Stuart Mill's political philosophy, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, and the constitutional scholarship of David Richards. ;With this project I explore and defend views that are traditionally associated with Liberal Democratic Theory and that are essential to it but for which fully developed and specific arguments have not been constructed. At a time when freedom of belief is frequently challenged either openly or surreptitiously, it is extremely important that our right to it is unequivocally established and defended