Abstract

This article examines certain aspects of current English doctrine in the light of applied property theory. Two of the problems of home-sharing which the law must address are: When should a claim be sustainable against the party who has legal title? Should such claims be exigible against successors of the title-holder? When statue is silent, three doctrinal streams of case-law are invoked. They concern money-down resulting trust interests, proprietary estoppel claims, and common intention constructive trust interests. The 'just outcome' is prayed in aid, intermittently and interstitially, when the doctrinal solution is unclear or when doctrine itself is developed. This article reverses the usual approach. It asks what sound 'property-specific justice reasons' are relevant to the home-sharing problems. They are canvassed before an imaginary Justice Tribunal: (i) no going back on a gift; (ii) perfecting a contract; (iii) fruits of money; (iv) induced expectations; (v) labour desert; (vi) home need; (vii) windfall wealth. Current doctrine is assessed in their light