Doubts About Conceptual Analysis

In Reasoning, meaning, and mind. New York: Oxford University Press (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Contrary to Jackson's claim, the rejection of analyticity is based on consideration of central cases.

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/0198238029.003.0007

Other Versions

original Harman, Gilbert (1994) "Doubts about conceptual analysis". In Michael, Murray, O'Leary-Hawthorne, John, Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, pp. 43--48: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1994)

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,899

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Doubts about conceptual analysis.Gilbert Harman - 1994 - In Murray Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne, Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 43--48.
Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind.Michaelis Michael & John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Kluwer Academic Publishers. Edited by Michaelis Michael & John O’Leary-Hawthorne.
Analyticity and incorrigibility.Manuel Campos - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):689-708.
Reductive explanation, concepts, and a priori entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.
Types of conceptual enquiry : a case for thinking there is a type that does not depend on the notion of analyticity.Ryan Dawes - 2011 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - In The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 50–74.
Serious metaphysics: Frank Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis.William G. Lycan - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft, Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson.Ian Ravenscroft (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-25

Downloads
12 (#1,457,383)

6 months
4 (#1,016,770)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gilbert Harman
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Schauer's Anti‐Essentialism.Torben Spaak - 2016 - Ratio Juris 29 (2):182-214.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references