Why mixed equilibria may not be conventions

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 43 (1):41-68 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his Convention David Lewis defined conventions as behavioural regularities instantiating proper coordination equilibria made salient by precedent and operational by this being common knowledge. While later proponents of game theoretical approaches in the study of convention have agreed on dropping Lewis’ eccentric ‘coordination’ requirement as well as that of common knowledge, they are confused as to whether conventions should be regarded as proper thereby precluding mixed equilibria. In this paper I argue that mixed equilibria may not be conventions, but also suggest that the reason for this reveals that though common knowledge is not necessary for a convention to operate, it may be utilized to identify the conventional aspect of a given practice.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,757

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Knowledge, equilibrium and convention.P. Vanderschraaf - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (3):337-369.
A new type of convention?Dale Smith - 2016 - Revus 30:69-76.
Convention and common ground.Bart Geurts - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):115-129.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The normativity of Lewis Conventions.Francesco Guala - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3107-3122.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-16

Downloads
27 (#833,502)

6 months
14 (#239,352)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pelle Guldborg Hansen
Roskilde University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references