Abstract

THE Identity Theory of Herbert Feigl is an elaborate and painstaking attempt to overcome the perplexities of the mind-body problem which Anglo-Saxon philosophers have inherited from Descartes and which has been compounded by the empiricist heritage of Hume. In common with influential contemporaries such as Russell, Ryle, Strawson and Hampshire, Feigl believes that the substance dualism of Descartes is an incoherent doctrine. There can be no adequate account of the nature and status of the person if mind and body, conscious immaterial self and extended corporeal substance are regarded as distinct and disparate entities. It is paradoxical however and indicative of the pervasive influence of the Cartesian framework, that the Identity Theory combines an explicit rejection of dualism with an uncompromising acceptance and even extension of another feature of that framework, in that it hinges on a more comprehensive reliance on the knowledge claims of science than even Descartes was prepared to sanction.