Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is threefold: First, I attempt to clarify and deepen discussions over the usefulness and possibility of codifying morality and moral evaluation that we find in the work of G. E. M. Anscombe, Bernard Williams, Annette Baier, Jonathan Dancy, and others. I clarify what has come to be called the 'theory/anti-theory debate' in ethics by examining the potency of various anti-theorist criticisms of moral theory. This involves untangling some often overlooked metaphysical as well as epistemological aims and assumptions of moral theory--aims and assumptions that are operative from, at least, Henry Sidgwick through John Rawls. For instance, the difference between moral principles as moral criteria as opposed to being the basis of a decision-procedure is often neglected, but it is a distinction which has an impact upon the effectiveness of various anti-theorist criticisms. I conclude that some specific anti-theorist challenges to moral theory are potent enough to seriously put into question the standard aim of attaining a codified account of moral normativity. Second, I argue that some aims and assumptions of anti-theorist positions are as problematic as those of their moral theory opponents. I conclude that the difficulties for both moral theorists and anti-theorists are a result of the fact that each side employs conceptions of the structure of moral normativity which are overly idealized. And, I contend that a failure to recognize the respective idealizations has led to the neglect of potential middle positions. Third, I articulate a less idealized, 'in-between' model of the structure of moral normativity that is inspired by the ethical works of W. D. Ross and H. J. McCloskey