Abstract

Infinitism is an often-dismissed and seldom-discussed theory about the formal structure of epistemic justification, according to which a proposition is justified iff it has an infinite and non-circular chain of reasons. After introducing infinitism and competing structures of justification through Agrippa’s trilemma, this paper sheds further light on infinitism and argues that infinitism is not worse than coherentism. While mostly focusing on Peter Klein’s version of infinitism, other infinitists and their theories are mentioned. Comparisons to coherentism are made to demonstrate that infinitism is not worse off than its competition. Following that, infinitism’s relationship with scepticism is evaluated. A sceptical argument by Tim Oakley according to which infinitism leads to scepticism regarding doxastic justification is criticised. This paper concludes that infinitism is as deserving of recognition as competing theories about the structure of justification.