Epistemology Without Intuition

International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities 3 (10):49-53 (2018)
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Abstract

From Plato to the present, intuition plays a central role in epistemology. My concern in this paper is with the nature and epistemic status of intuition. To that end, I will be reviewing both Bealer’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of intuition. I will be arguing that by ‘intuition’ Bealer understands modal intuition that has Platonic and metaphysical roles. Subsequently, I shall also show that although Wittgenstein’s view avoids these two issues, it amounts to the idea that intuition is a normative activity with a dialectical value. As a result, if Bealer and Wittgenstein are right, then intuition should no more have any epistemic and evidential role.

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Manhal Hamdo
University of Delhi

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References found in this work

Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 201-240.
The incoherence of empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.
A priori knowledge and the scope of philosophy.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism.George Bealer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:289-365.
On the possibility of philosophical knowledge.George Bealer - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:1-34.

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