Abstract

In the first part of the dissertation, I provide a general account of the nature of moral integrity. I maintain that commitment plays a central role in understanding the nature of integrity and proceed to analyze the notion of commitment. There is also a discussion of what normally counts as the appropriate principles or ideals to which persons of integrity ought to be committed. In addition, I address issues concerning whether or not the commitments of persons of integrity are usually pursued in the face of adversity and maintained consistently. The main conclusion drawn in the first part of the dissertation is that persons of integrity are characteristically committed to doing what's morally best where that commitment would be consistently maintained under conditions of adversity. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I discuss the connection between integrity and compromise. I begin with an analysis of two senses of the term 'uncompromising' and proceed to examine the general nature of compromise. In addition, a distinction is made between moral and non-moral compromise. One of the central claims made in this part of the dissertation is that persons of integrity may be justified in engaging in non-moral compromises but they are not typically justified in pursuing the path of moral compromise. This should not, however, be interpreted to mean such persons must rigidly pursue some objective since there is an important difference between compromise and revision or reassessment; and persons of integrity may revise their moral principles or reassess their moral ideals without suffering a loss of integrity. I also discuss the way in which ascriptions of integrity are tied to moral conflict and the experiencing of certain emotions. ;In the final part of the dissertation, I am concerned primarily with the value of moral integrity. An analysis of the notions of intrinsic goodness and instrumental goodness is provided; and the claim is made that moral integrity may instead have contributive value or value as part of some whole. More specifically, I defend the view that integrity has value as part of a whole where that whole is identified as a certain "kind of person."