Real numbers, quantities, and measurement

Philosophia Mathematica 10 (3):304-323 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Defining the real numbers by abstraction as ratios of quantities gives prominence to then- applications in just the way that Frege thought we should. But if all the reals are to be obtained in this way, it is necessary to presuppose a rich domain of quantities of a land we cannot reasonably assume to be exemplified by any physical or other empirically measurable quantities. In consequence, an explanation of the applications of the reals, defined in this way, must proceed indirectly. This paper explains the main complications involved and answers the main objections advanced in Batitsky's paper in this issue.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,597

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
163 (#143,382)

6 months
20 (#148,041)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

What is neologicism?Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta - 2006 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):60-99.
On the Philosophical Significance of Frege’s Constraint.Andrea Sereni - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (2):244–275.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1956 - Oxford: Macmillan. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees & G. H. von Wright.
Frege.Michael Dummett - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 15 references / Add more references