Compact Representations of Extended Causal Models

Cognitive Science 37 (6):986-1010 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Judea Pearl (2000) was the first to propose a definition of actual causation using causal models. A number of authors have suggested that an adequate account of actual causation must appeal not only to causal structure but also to considerations of normality. In Halpern and Hitchcock (2011), we offer a definition of actual causation using extended causal models, which include information about both causal structure and normality. Extended causal models are potentially very complex. In this study, we show how it is possible to achieve a compact representation of extended causal models

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Ramsey Test Analysis of Causation for Causal Models.Holger Andreas & Mario Günther - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):587-615.
Identity, structure, and causal representation in scientific models.Kevin D. Hoover - 2013 - In Hsiang-Ke Chao, Szu-Ting Chen & Roberta L. Millstein, Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 35-57.
Structural equations and beyond.Franz Huber - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):709-732.
Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.
Causal Sufficiency and Actual Causation.Sander Beckers - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6):1341-1374.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-08-01

Downloads
97 (#225,928)

6 months
5 (#752,882)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Joseph Y. Halpern
Cornell University
Christopher Hitchcock
California Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.
Structural equations and beyond.Franz Huber - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):709-732.
What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?Franz Huber - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):81-110.
Can Physics Make Us Free?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Physics 5.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.

View all 32 references / Add more references