Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains

Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):75-87 (2021)
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Abstract

Intentional explanations are explanations of actions that specify the motive for which the action was done. A central question is whether causality plays a role in such explanations. Causalists ins...

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2022

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10.1080/13869795.2021.1980604

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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Dispositions and conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
Recent Work on Dispositions.Troy Cross - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):115-124.
Problems in the explanation of action.Donald Davidson - 1987 - In John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart. New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.

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