A generic model of consciousness

Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 10 (2):291--308 (2023)
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Abstract

This is a model of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness, what it feels like, is answered. The work builds on medical research analyzing the source and mechanisms associated with our feelings. It goes further by describing a generic model with wide applicability. The model is fully consistent with medical pathways in humans, but easily extends to animals and AI. The essence of the model is the interplay between associative memory and physiology. The model is a clear and concrete counterexample to the famous philosophical objections to a scientific explanation.

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2023-11-30

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: Polity.

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