Phronēsis and Contemplation

Dialogue 60 (3):475-482 (2021)
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Abstract

RésuméUne interprétation attrayante de la psychologie morale d'Aristote soutient que la vertu de caractère fixe la fin de la bonne vie. De ce point de vue, la sagesse pratique ouphronēsisne fournit que les moyens vers la fin qui est saisie par les vertus de caractère. Pourtant, cette vision a du mal à rendre compte de la suprématie de la vie contemplative, qui est clairement la meilleure vie au sens paradigmatique ou strict pour Aristote. Dans cet article, je soutiens que l'intellect joue un rôle pour Aristote dans la réalisation de la priorité de la vie contemplative et son intégration dans la totalité de notre vie pratique.

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John Hacker-Wright
University of Guelph

References found in this work

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - In Mary J. Gregor, Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37-108.
5. Aristotle on Learning to Be Good.Myles Burnyeat - 1980 - In Amélie Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press. pp. 69-92.
Reason and emotion: Essays on ancient moral psychology.Chris Bobonich - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):263-267.

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