The unreality of virtual reality: An approach from philosophical skepticism

Apuntes Filosóficos 25 (48):69-83 (2016)
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Abstract

Philosophical analysis plays a fundamental role in understanding new forms of human and social configuration in relation to the use of new technologies, such as Virtual Reality. In this article we offer a small contribution to this issue by analyzing the concept of Virtual Reality in the light of two perspectives from philosophical skepticism about reality: that of George Berkeley as a representative of subjective idealism and the derivative of the skeptical hypothesis about the real world represented by the image of the evil genius of Descartes and the brain in a vat.

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IV*—On Putnam's Proof that We are not Brains-in-a-Vat1.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1):67-94.
George Berkeley.Lisa Downing - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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