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The Possibility of Undistinguishedness
Philosophical Studies 180 (2):609-613 (2023)
Abstract
It is natural to assume that every value bearer must be good, bad, or neutral. This paper argues that this assumption is false if value incomparability is possible. More precisely, if value incommensurability is possible, then there is a fourth category of absolute value, in addition to the good, the bad, and the neutral.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
No Outcome Is Good, Bad, or Evaluatively Neutral for Anyone.Michael Rabenberg - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (5-6):654-670.
On neutral value and fitting indifference.Andrés G. Garcia - 2024 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):337-347.
References found in this work
Introduction.Ruth Chang - 1997 - In Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard. pp. 1-34.
Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):81-110.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Science and Society 9 (4):366-369.
On the Logic of "Intrinsically Better".Roderick M. Chisholm & Ernest Sosa - 1966 - American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (3):244-249.
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