Abstract

This dissertation explores ways in which the Swiss psychoanalyst Ludwig Binswanger adapts Martin Heidegger's account of the person as Dasein or Being-in-the-world to the task of developing a new psychology and more satisfactory explanations of psychological pathology. Heidegger's "existential analytic" of Dasein conceives of the individual in terms explicitly opposed to the dualistic, "Cartesian," separation of mind and body. For Heidegger, the existence and identity of each person cannot be separated from the concrete particulars of where he or she is located in space in time, society and history. Binswanger, understanding Heidegger's emphasis on existential freedom as self-determination or "world-design," has been criticized as being "too Cartesian," as failing fully to appreciate that each individual is thrown into a world not of his or her own making. In contrast to Heidegger's assessment, I argue that Binswanger's work is better understood as incorporating some aspects of Heidegger's view of Dasein while also relying significantly on a more traditional understanding of the subject. Instead of being strictly Cartesian, Binswanger draws from both Cartesian and non-Cartesian views of the person, and his work is ultimately confused between these two views. I examine how Binswanger makes use of those parts of Heidegger's account of Dasein that are relevant to therapy by looking at the differing ways Binswanger portrays Heidegger's concern with the Being of persons, as well as how Binswanger understands Heidegger's accounts of freedom and authenticity. Binswanger's positive views of the person, freedom, authenticity, and world-design are shown to draw from Heidegger's view as well as more Cartesian notions of the person. I also explore how Binswanger's accounts of the methods of therapy reflect his confusion between Cartesian and non-Cartesian accounts of the person