Abstract

The Old Nyāya believes that a cause has a causal power of some kind, and it is possible to have valid cognition of a causal event. But Nāgārjuna (2nd century) challenged the very idea of causality. Also, he attacked the concept of epistemic instruments (_pramāṇa_). Śrīharṣa (12th century) too found counterexamples to the Nyāya definition of valid cognition. These attacks raised fundamental questions about the Naiyāyika’s take on the validity of causal statements. In 14 th century, Gaṅgeśa defended the Nyāya theories of causality by shifting the starting point, and redefined causality. He completely bypassed the ontological issues raised by Nāgārjuna, and sought to answer an epistemic question: Is the knowledge about a causal event possible? In this essay, I shall critically examine his answer. He adopted the Old Nyāya view that a valid cognition leads one to pragmatic success, and stated that all pragmatically successful cognitions about causal events were valid. But he was aware of the fact that success could also be accidental. His ‘inferential defeater’ has the potential to rule out cases of accidental success or epistemic luck in the inferential context, although his definition of valid cognition seems to apply to those. In this essay, I shall formulate a definition of ‘epistemic defeater’ by modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of ‘inferential defeater’, and shall use the new concept for modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of valid cognition. This modified definition of valid cognition—I shall argue—will be able to rule out most of the problematic cases cited by Śrīharṣa.