The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant’s Moral Theory

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):593-624 (1999)
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Abstract

It is common to think that certain acts are supererogatory, especially certain heroic or saintly self-sacrifices for the good. The idea seems to have an ordinary and clear application. Nothing shows this better than the well-known cases which J. O. Urmson adduced. Urmson argued that no major moral theory could give a proper account of the supererogatory character of such acts, and that therefore none could account for “all the facts of morality,” as he put it. But his arguments were sketchy. This paper shall show, in some detail, that he was essentially right about Kant’s moral theory, and that the criticism goes deep and holds up against recent sympathetic interpretation of Kant’s views of duty and worth.

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Daniel Guevara
University of California, Santa Cruz

Citations of this work

Kant on Virtue.Claus Dierksmeier - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):597-609.
The Vice of Admiration.Jan-Willem van der Rijt - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (1):69-90.
Kant’s sacrificial turns.Paolo Diego Bubbio - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2):97-115.
Kant-Bibliographie 1999.M. Ruffing - 2001 - Kant Studien 92 (4):474-517.

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