Surprised by reason: Naturalism and historical agency in the early Marx

Abstract

This paper concerns Marx’s case, especially in the German Ideology, for the relative privilege of his own conception of history. I argue, against what I call the standard interpretation, that Marx’s case does not rest on an inversion of Young Hegelian “idealism”; against the “revisionist interpretation,” I argue that Marx nevertheless sustains a concern with the justificatory adequacy of his position. Marx’s argument, on my interpretation, is that an account of productive agency is a necessary constituent of any understanding of history, and in turn requires a reflexive component. The reflexive character of agency can only be adequately realized under conditions in which historical processes and the causal effectiveness of individual agency are aligned. Marx’s justification, then, relies on an account of the internal character of historical agency rather than on metaphysical claims about the real. Marx, I suggest, was attempting to offer a distinctively “practical” justification. (147 words).

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2009-01-28

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Robert Guay
State University of New York at Binghamton

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