Cooperation in and out of the lab: a comment on Binmore’s paper [Book Review]

Mind and Society 9 (2):159-169 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The disagreement between Binmore and the “behaviouralists” concerns mainly the kind of reciprocity mechanisms that sustain cooperation in and out of the experimental laboratory. Although Binmore’s scepticism concerning Strong Reciprocity is justified, his case for Weak Reciprocity and the long-run convergence to Nash equilibria is unsupported by laboratory evidence. Part of the reason is that laboratory evidence alone cannot solve the reciprocity controversy, and researchers should pay more attention to field data. As an example, I briefly illustrate a historical case suggesting that the institutions that foster cooperation in the real world rely on Weak Reciprocity mechanisms such as those that feature prominently in Binmore’s story

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-14

Downloads
53 (#409,260)

6 months
7 (#706,906)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Francesco Guala
Università degli Studi di Milano

References found in this work

Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Natural justice.Ken Binmore - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):604-606.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.

View all 16 references / Add more references