Van Fraassen's metaphysical move

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (1):21 – 34 (1991)
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Abstract

Various aspects of van Fraassen's constructive empiricism are discussed. His concept of observability is said to have opened few unresolvable dilemmas. It is because of the confusion between observable/non-observable and testable/metaphysical distinctions. Finally, the constructive empiricist is said to have failed in his attempt at reducing the metaphysical component of science.

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Adam Grobler
Uniwersytet Opolski

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Realism and the aim of science.Karl R. Popper - 1988 - New York: Routledge. Edited by William Warren Bartley.
Realism.Michael Dummett - 1982 - Synthese 52 (1):145--165.
On accepting Van Fraassen's image of science.Jeff Foss - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):79-92.

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