Aristotle against the determinist: Metaphysics 6.3

International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1998):127-136 (1998)
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Abstract

The article tries to show that Aristotle's refutation of causal determinism in Metaph. 6.3 is grounded mainly on two assumptions: a. that there must be a first member of any causal chain, and b. that the origin and the outcome of the chain have to be of equal status.

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Filip Grgic
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

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