“Physical Intentionality” and the Thomistic Theory of Formal Objects

In Bartłomiej Skowron (ed.), Contemporary Polish Ontology. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 245-270 (2019)
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Action and Active Powers.Robin T. Bianchi - 2024 - Philosophia 53:1-19.

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