Abstract

Galston's study of liberalism sets out to establish the autonomy of liberal political thinking from older, more traditional concepts of the good. The author attempts to anchor his discussion in the liberal political theories of Locke and Kant and in a critical assessment of democratic socialists Ronald Dworkin, Judith Shklar, John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, and Michael Walzer. Though the book is cluttered with name references, the strongest presences may be those that are unannounced. Galston's object brings to mind the postmodernist quest for a nonfoundationalist philosophy. Like nonfoundationalist ethical thinkers, Galston is looking for an immanentist interpretation of the good, which rests on self-enclosed and self-referring premises about the relative value of human actions. Individual self-realization, mutual respect of persons, and government by consent, are all concepts upon which his analysis turns. Another undisclosed point of reference for this book is Hans Blumenberg's Über die Legitimität der Neuzeit, a seminal exposition of the moral and intellectual autonomy of the modern age. Like Blumenberg, Galston is intent on showing that modernity, here identified with liberal society, can stand on its own philosophical feet. Those feet are individualistic but also fortified by utilitarian and neo-Kantian components, without the acknowledged admixture of preliberal legacies. Galston takes the need for a purely liberal ethic for a liberal society so seriously that he contends with radical democrat Jurgen Habermas for not taking it seriously enough. Unlike Galston, Habermas insists that democratic pluralism requires core values that do not derive entirely from liberalism. Significantly, neither thinker bothers to make much of a distinction between welfare state democrats and classical liberals. Economic collectivism is not seen as incompatible with the principle of individuality, providing the collectivist arrangements can be linked to individual interest.