Abstract

At the core of intellectual property (IP) law lies a fundamental question of political philosophy: can any argument justify the state’s grant of private property rights in intangibles? Scholars answering this question frequently resort to a single theory or value, such as efficiency, natural rights, or personality. But each justification offered faces substantial objections. To overcome the limitations of other theories, an emerging group of scholars, who we dub IP Pluralists, argue that IP can be justified using more than one theory or value. This Article is the first to critically evaluate the pluralist arguments for IP. In so doing, it highlights “IP’s pluralism puzzle”: surprisingly few scholars have explicitly articulated a pluralist argument for IP rights despite a reasonably common belief that one exists. Given these arguments face serious objections, the potential gap between belief in pluralism and reasoned argument against believing it presents a puzzle. The Article tries to explain why the puzzle exists and how it might be solved.