Forms of Authority and the Real Argumentum ad Verecundiam

Abstract

We ordinarily distinguish between the authority exercised by an expert and that exercised by a commander. Nevertheless, prior argumentation theorists have been unable to articulate fully the grounds on which we make this distinction. In this paper, I propose a principle for distinguishing types of authorities. I argue further that on this principle, Locke's argumentum ad verecundiam represents a third type, reducible neither to command nor expertise. Finally, I point to significant instances of this third appeal to authority, especially in Roman legal and political discourse.

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Citations of this work

Locke and “ad”.Richard Davies - 2023 - Argumentation 37 (3):473-492.

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References found in this work

Authority.Richard S. Peters - 1967 - In Anthony Quinton & Isaiah Berlin (eds.), Political philosophy. London,: Oxford University Press. pp. 83--96.

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