Abstract

There have been many images of experiment. The contemplative narratives of Aristotle served to illustrate hypotheses and arguments. There was no expectation that they be performed. Even in Galileo's dialogues, the distinction between real experiments and imaginary ones is not sharp (see galileo). During the seventeenth century, performance and public description became essential to the probative power of experiment. These made its methods and procedures transparent, allowing any reader of the narrative to be a virtual witness of an active demonstration (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, pp. 22–79). Thus, by the end of the scientific revolution, illustrative narratives were distinguished from public accounts of experiment as the disciplined, systematic study of phenomena. Eventually this made the efficacy of thought experiments problematic (see Kuhn 1977, pp. 241–2, and thought experiments). As a source of experience of realms previously beyond the reach of the senses, real‐world experiment contributed to the rise of objective scientific knowledge. Harvey, Galileo, Hooks, Boyle, Newton, and other proponents of experimental natural philosophy established an important new mode of argumentation.