The Ordinary Concept of Knowledge How

In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 104-115 (2018)
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Abstract

We present experimental results that support the claim that the folk concept of knowledge how is an epistemological hybrid, encompassing both intellectualist and praxist elements.

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Author Profiles

Chad Gonnerman
University of Southern Indiana
Kaija Mortensen
Randolph College

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