On experimental and philosophical investigations of mental timing: A response to commentary

Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
682 (#40,395)

6 months
105 (#59,282)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

What should we retain from a plain person's concept of free will?Gilberto Gomes - 2005 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1):40-43.
On Timing Relations between Brain and World.William P. Banks - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-143.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Physical, neural, and mental timing.Wim van de Grind - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):241-64.
Problems in the timing of conscious experience.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.
The timing of conscious states.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.

View all 11 references / Add more references