Why social epistemology is real epistemology

In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29 (2008)
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Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Theorizing about the epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.
Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology.Spyrion Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8):105-120.
Thought styles and paradigms—a comparative study of Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn.Nicola Mößner - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):362–371.

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