To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract

Sandford C. Goldberg puts forward a theory of epistemic normativity that is grounded in the things we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. This theory has far-reaching implications not only for the theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of epistemic assessment itself.

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Sanford Goldberg
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.
Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is White Ignorance?Annette Martín - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa073.
The significance of epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):807-828.

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