Abstract

Pascal's Wager is analyzed and critiqued in Part I. The main objections to Pascal's argument are raised and various attempts to salvage the argument are discussed. These problems include the dubious assumption that one is forced to believe either that God exists or that God does not exist, and the questionable assumption that one will gain infinite happiness if and only if God exists and one believes in God's existence. Also problematic is the use of an infinite value in an expected-value calculation. Part II argues for a pragmatic justification of religious faith that is inspired by but significantly different from Pascal's Wager. To construct this argument it is necessary to refine some traditional theological notions. God is conceived as "transcendent" in that he is qualitatively superior to any other possible being, yet "immanent" in that it is possible for him to have personal relationships with human beings. A "devout religious person" has an overriding goal to attain a good personal relationship with God; a person is "religious" to the extent that he pursues this goal. Certain kinds of personal relationships, such as love, constitute an extraordinarily valuable kind of human good, and such a relationship with God would constitute a kind of human good that is absolutely qualitatively superior, that is, qualitatively superior to any other possible kind of human good. The Principle of Expected Value is tailored for decision problems where goods of varying quality are deemed to be at stake, and the application of this principle yields that it is pragmatically rational to have an overriding goal to attain a good which is absolutely qualitatively superior. Thus it is pragmatically rational to be a devout religious person. This in turn yields that it is pragmatically rational to have "religious faith", which is viewed as a pragmatic commitment or assumption for practical purpose that God exists, and is to be distinguished sharply from other propositional attitudes such as the "belief" or "hope" that God exists.