Abstract

In the Politics Aristotle challenges the view, held by most prominent political theorists today, that democracy is the just political order. In the first place, democracy is not, contrary to appearances, the rule of all but of only a part of society. Democracy is the rule of the people; by the people we mean above all the common man as distinct from, and at times opposed to, those who stand out on account of their family, wealth, power, or natural abilities. And the people's interests will conflict with those of other groups and individuals in society. ;But if democracy is not the rule of all, neither is any other political order. Indeed, nondemocratic political orders consist in a minority of the populace ruling over the rest. For these reasons, according to Aristotle, we are compelled to raise the question of who should rule, that is, of what group or individual deserves to rule. ;The democrats claim they deserve an equal share in ruling because they are equally free. While their freedom, understood in contrast to slavery, has some bearing on their claim to deserve to rule--it means in practice, for instance, that the people help preserve the political community by fighting for it--this is not the sole or even highest title to rule. Freedom does not confer, for instance, the competence to rule well. Nor is freedom the highest human quality simply. And yet, since political rule is arguably the highest honor that human beings can enjoy, sovereignty over the political community might seem to belong to those of outstanding virtue. For such reasons as these, according to Aristotle, democracy cannot be a simply just political order. ;Nevertheless, in civilized times a decent political order other than democracy becomes all but impossible: the people will no longer defer to any minority, however excellent. Accordingly, Aristotle investigates the arrangements of a moderate democracy and the conditions, both political and nonpolitical, that favor its stability. In doing so he brings us to see the reasons why even moderate democracies will tend to degenerate into extreme and therefore unstable democracies of very questionable justice