Latent variables, psychological constructs, and the prospect of scientific kinds in psychology

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper, we consider how latent variables of mainstream quantitative psychology fits with two different models of scientific kinds. On the one hand, there is a good reason to think they fit with taxonomic and predictive success criteria that are popular within an epistemic understanding of scientific kinds. On the other hand, they conflict with widely shared person-based ontological commitments that underwrite psychological kinds because this research rests in large part on between-individual studies. We explore the implications of the different views on scientific kinds and argue that this is indeed a dilemma for the scientific discipline of psychology

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Marion Godman
Cambridge University

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What is a (social) structural explanation?Sally Haslanger - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):113-130.
Individualism and psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.

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