Philosophical Blindness

Review of Metaphysics 58 (1):147-170 (2004)
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Abstract

PHILOSOPHERS MAY BE ARMED with valid and logically faultless arguments and yet remain entirely blind to meaningful possibilities whose philosophical significance is immense. Philosophical blindness may also concern physical or psychical phenomena as well as their meanings and significance. Some entirely valid arguments should be considered blind. Argumentatively and logically, such arguments are deemed faultless or good enough. Hence, in this respect, blind arguments should not be bad ones. Yet, they have greatly misled philosophers by shutting their eyes to realize, understand, and see deeply into crucial philosophical matters. The question is, what makes philosophers blind despite their valid, logically faultless, or even overwhelming arguments?

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Amihud Gilead
University of Haifa

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