Does contemporary recognition theory rest on a mistake?

Philosophy and Social Criticism 51 (1):132-156 (2025)
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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to argue, contra Axel Honneth, that ‘the summons’ ( Aufforderung), the central pillar of Fichte’s transcendentalist account of recognition, is best made sense of not as an ‘invitation’, but rather as a second-personal demand, whose illocutionary content draws attention to the demandingness of responsibilities towards vulnerable agents. Because of this, the summons has good explanatory force in terms of disclosing the phenomenological dynamics of psychosocially and politically significant reactive attitudes. Under my reading, then, Fichte’s position, contra Honneth’s ‘negative’ treatment of it, is anything but an empty formalism that ‘fails to refer to subjects of flesh and blood’.

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Paul Giladi
School of Oriental and African Studies

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References found in this work

Misrecognition and Epistemic Injustice.José Medina - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4).
The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person.Thomas Khurana - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):552-561.
Recognition and the moral nexus.R. Jay Wallace - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):634-645.

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