Abstract

This dissertation investigates the normative foundation of critical social theory, arguing that a lack of recognition of epistemological subjectivity as the foundation of normativity has permitted various forms of objectivistic (metaphysical) thinking to dominate the field. Metaphysical thinking uncritically posits a reality grounded solely in the mind’s ‘intentional’ theoretical projections as a mind-independent object. By adhering to this mode of thought, critical social theory misconstrues social reality, which is primarily formed through the practices of real human subjects, as being metaphysically constituted. Metaphysical thinking also falsely integrates transcendental subjectivity in the objective order of things and, thus, overlooks the essential need for transcendence as the foundation for normative practices. To liberate social theory from this alienation of the transcendental subject, this project begins with an analysis of metaphysical thought in general, drawing on Edmund Husserl’s method of transcendental phenomenology, and offers an expanded version of Kant’s critique of speculative reason. The scope of Kant’s critical investigation is confined to scholastic metaphysics, which limits its applicability in contemporary contexts. To overcome this limitation, this dissertation explores further transcendental elements at work in metaphysical thinking beyond those investigated by Kant and analyses two examples of contemporary metaphysical thinking, namely, the philosophies of Heidegger and Derrida. Transcendental phenomenology has been critiqued for purportedly advocating an ahistorical, disembodied, purely epistemological notion of subjectivity. This dissertation challenges such critiques by showing that commitment to transcendental-theoretical subjectivity allows for an analysis of material and historical subjectivity as part of a broader understanding of transcendental phenomenology. A phenomenology of material subjectivity then traces the origin of the fundamental concepts of social theory—such as alienation, justice, freedom, etc.—back to the economic structure of the lifeworld while asserting that a purely materialist and genetic analysis of these concepts fails to reveal their essentially normative nature. By maintaining a firm distinction between the transcendental and the material through epoche, transcendental phenomenology is capable of providing a normative ground for critique. This approach lays the groundwork for developing a phenomenologically clarified notion of teleological rationality on non-metaphysical grounds as an alternative to the instrumental rationality dominant in Western civilization.